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Consider two cases of motivation.
Case 1: An eccentric psychologist kidnapped Jack and forced him to undergo psychological conditioning.  The result is that whenever Jack sees a person wearing a necktie, he gets a strong urge to bark like a dog.  Jack continues to have this motivation even after he escapes from the psychologist.

Case 2: Jill lives in a culture in which people in mourning wear ties, and in which the customary way to greet such people is to bark like a dog.  Jill, who wants to show respect to those in mourning, has a desire to bark at people who are wearing ties.




	Cases of alien desire are problematic for desire-based theories of the good because most people intuitively judge that their satisfaction creates no value.  The intellectual motivation for a desire-based theory of the good rests on the intuitive plausibility of saying that x is part of S's good if (and perhaps only if) S desires x.  But this plausibility runs out when we come to cases of alien desire.  Most people find it implausible to say that, for example, Jack's good includes successfully barking at tie-wearers, though most people find it plausible to say that Jill's does.  Insofar as unfulfilled desires can cause psychic distress, Jack probably creates some value by barking, for presumably he desires not to be in psychic distress.  But satisfying the desire is only one way of securing this value: he could also attempt to eliminate the desire that is the source of the distress.  According to fairly common moral intuitions, Jill's case is fundamentally different.  The satisfaction of her desire creates value over and above any value created by preventing the distress she might experience from its frustration.  If we give both Jack and Jill a drug that alleviates frustration-related distress, the satisfaction of Jack's desire no longer seems to create any value at all, but the satisfaction of Jill's desire does.​[3]​  
	So for the desire theorist to even get her project going, she must have a way to separate alien from authentic desires.  She can then abandon the principle that x is part of S's good if (and perhaps only if) S has a desire (of any kind) for x and instead use the more plausible principle that x is part of S's good if (and perhaps only if) S has a non-alien desire for x.  In order to do this, she needs an analysis of alien desires, both so she can specify which desires to exclude, and so she can offer a rationale for their exclusion.  
	Two main questions arise about the intuitions that alien desires do not contribute to the good.  First, are the intuitions correct?  And if they are, then how can we account for the moral differences between alien and authentic desires?  A theory of alien desires should answer both questions.
	Such a theory should also solve the following puzzle.  When conditioning techniques are used without the knowledge and consent of the victim, the desires produced can be alien, as in Case 1.  It may seem that conditioning always produces alien desires.  Yet conditioning techniques can have enormous therapeutic potential when used responsibly and with the knowledge and consent of the patient.  In addition, they can be used by one person on himself.  When conditioning is used in these ways, the motivational changes produced often seem not to be alien.  Consider Case 3:

Case 3: Hansel reflects on his goals and character, and determines that it would be advantageous for him to be a more focussed and disciplined worker.  He does not want to be so distractable on the job.  That is, he wants it to be the case that when he is at work, he wants to work.  However, this second order want on its own is insufficient to produce the first order motivation to work.  So Hansel undergoes various conditioning processes to instill in himself the motivation to work while on the job.  This conditioning is successful, so that the motivation to work continues (at least for a time) after the conditioning processes have come to an end.

Hansel seems to be engaged in just the sort of rational character planning that is a hallmark of personal autonomy.  It is well known that one often cannot simply change one's desires on command.  This is Hansel's problem.  His solution is to use conditioning to instill the desire he has rationally chosen.  I think most people would want to say that Hansel's new desire is authentic. If this intuition is correct, what explains the fact that conditioning techniques can produce such morally different effects as those we find in Case 1 and Case 3?  
	One obvious answer would be that conditioning creates alien desire if and only if it takes place without the knowledge and consent of the person undergoing it.​[4]​  This suggestion does give us the right answer in all the cases we have examined so far: Jill's desire is obviously authentic, Jack's alien desire results from conditioning against his will, and Hansel's authentic desire results from conditioning to which he consents.  But it turns out that we cannot simply say that a technique creates authentic desires if the subject wants the technique to be applied.  For suppose her wanting to undergo the treatment was itself alien, as in case 4:
Case 4: An especially insidious eccentric psychologist uses conditioning techniques to instill in Gretel a desire to come back to his lab and have some other desires implanted through conditioning.  This results in Gretel consenting to undergo more conditioning.

Is the motivation that results from the conditioning to which Gretel now consents authentic just because she consented?  Surely this kind of consent does not guarantee authenticity.  So something else must determine whether a given instance of conditioning creates an alien desire.  We would like an analysis of alien desire to tell us what that something else is.
	Before I present and defend my analysis of alien desire, let me recapitulate what such a theory should be able to do.  An analysis of alien desire should:
1. Distinguish between cases of conditioning which produce alien desires and those that produce authentic desires in a way that agrees with our strongest intuitions.

2.  Explain why conditioning sometimes produces alien and sometimes produces authentic desires.

3. Explain the sense in which alien desires are not part of the self.

4. Tell us whether and why alien desires fail to create value. 

II. AN ANALYSIS OF ALIEN DESIRE
The term `conditioning' is commonly used to include a number of techniques, at least some of which can apparently bypass the higher cognitive processes and change behavior without necessarily changing belief.  Conditioning takes three main forms: classical or Pavlovian, operant, and aversive.​[5]​  Since classical conditioning typically shapes behavior that is involuntary (salivation, etc.), it is not at all clear that it implants desires.​[6]​  For this reason I will ignore classical conditioning in what follows, for I am interested here in processes that implant desires.  Operant conditioning occurs when a behavior becomes more frequent, or the motivation to engage in it become stronger (or both), because that behavior has been rewarded.  Aversive conditioning is the converse of operant conditioning: a behavior is paired with or followed by a noxious stimulus with the object of eliminating the behavior.
	Because operant conditioning can produce motivation without changing beliefs, it can motivate a person to act in ways she would be motivated to act if she believed something that she does not in fact believe.  This seems to be what has happened in Case 1.  Jack is motivated to act in a way that would be understandable (i.e., reasonable) if he believed any number of things he does not believe: that people wearing ties like to hear farm-animal imitations, that ties are gods and that barking like a dog is a form of worship, or simply that something bad will happen if he does not bark like a dog when he sees a person with a tie.  It seems to me that this is the key feature that makes Jack's desire alien.
	The most straightforward way for a desire to be one you would have if you believed some proposition that you do not believe, is for it to be caused by a belief-like representational state the content of which you do not actually believe.  And that's what I think an alien desire is.  This analysis of alien desire presupposes a substantive theory of desire, one which can best be seen as a generalization of the view that Robert Audi has called Motivational Foundationalism.​[7]​  Motivational foundationalism (hereafter MF), as Audi defines it, holds that at least some desires are caused by a combination of beliefs and other desires.  On the most plausible version of this view, the relation that holds between a desire on the one hand, and the belief and desire that caused it on the other, is something like the following:
(MF) 	If S desires that p, and S believes that q promotes p, 
		then, ceteris paribus, S will come to desire that q.

The most plausible version of this view holds that biological forces such as drives and homeostatic mechanisms produce or constitute basic desires that can then combine with beliefs and produce non-basic desires according to the above schema.
	A full defense of MF is beyond the scope of this paper, but let me just note that because our motivation is highly responsive to our beliefs, it is clear that beliefs effect motivation.  The structure of human motivation is both extremely hierarchical and highly instrumentally rational, and these facts can best be explained by the thesis that beliefs interact with desires to create new desires in the way that MF claims. 
	Now I have suggested that cases of alien desire arise when some representational state, with a content that is not the content of any belief, combines with a pre-existing desire to produce the new, alien desire.  In order to accommodate that analysis, we would need to enrich MF by postulating representational states that have some but not all of the properties of beliefs, and which can fill the role of a belief in the generation of desires from other desires according to the schema above.
	In what ways could such belief-like representational states differ from beliefs?  Beliefs, in what I shall call the "straightforward sense," have four important features.  First, straightforward beliefs are integrated with one another.  That is, they are, in Jerry Fodor's useful phrase, "global" or informationally unencapsulated mental states.  This is a crucial feature of straightforward beliefs; in fact, the other three features are all consequences of this one.  A single belief can be used in a wide variety of mental processes involving a wide variety of contexts.  In particular, it can combine and recombine with other beliefs to form new beliefs the contents of which bear various logical, semantic, and epistemic relations to the contents of the beliefs from which they arose.​[8]​  Now the fact that we often make various sorts of mistakes shows that beliefs do not combine with all other beliefs in all (or only) combinations that could generate other beliefs with the proper relations among the contents.  Nevertheless, to be a belief in the straightforward sense is to be a state that at least sometimes, or at least potentially, combines with other beliefs in these ways.  Second, beliefs are formed by cognitive-epistemic means and are subject to cognitive-epistemic control.  That is, one can typically instill or eradicate them merely by "exposing" them to other beliefs the contents of which bear logical (or epistemic) relations to the belief to be instilled or eradicated.  Third, beliefs are at least typically knowable directly through introspection.  Although one may not be constantly aware of all of her beliefs, one is typically able to tell by introspection whether she believes a proposition.  Fourth, beliefs are mental assertions; to believe that p is, ceteris paribus, to be willing to assert that p at least to oneself.
	I propose that we define a quasi-belief as a representational state that lacks each of these features, but which is otherwise like a belief.  Thus a quasi-belief is a representational state which can function like a belief in the formation of desire, but which is not formed by cognitive-epistemic means, does not participate in global cognitive processing, is not introspectively accessible, and has a content the person need not be willing to assert.  I propose that we modify MF to allow either a belief or a quasi-belief to combine with a desire to produce a new non-basic desire.  This modified MF would claim that 
(MMF) 	If S desires that p, and S believes or quasi-believes that q promotes p, 
			then, ceteris paribus, S will come to desire that q.
In the next section I will argue that we must abandon MF in favor of MMF in order to make sense of certain phenomena including but not limited to operant conditioning.

III. DEFENDING THE ANALYSIS
A set of phenomena that I will call flexible automatic responses provides powerful evidence for the existence of quasi-beliefs.  Flexible automatic responses include such phenomena as "overlearning" and "trained reflexes."  They can be deliberately cultivated, especially through repetitive training.​[9]​   Some of the clearest examples of flexible automatic response come from sports: the nearly-automatic swing of the baseball bat at just the right pitch; the uncannily accurate block executed by the expert boxer, fencer, or martial artist; the lightning-quick reaction of a goal tender.
	The phenomenon of flexible automatic response is not to be confused with the sub-doxastic micro-processing of motor information, which regulates the details of how a basic action is executed.  One is not obliged to think of such micro-level processing in belief-desire terms, but we are obliged to think of flexible automatic responses in these terms.  Unlike micro-level motor control, flexible automatic response consists of the automatic selection of a certain basic action out of two or more possible basic actions: perhaps in this case a low swing rather than a bunt, a parry to the left rather than to the right.  This selection of basic actions does seem to require the notions of belief and desire.  And in flexible automatic response this automatic selection takes place non-consciously and involves informational states that are encapsulated (and therefore not open to introspection).  These states bear information, yet they do not seem to be beliefs in the straightforward sense.
	Let us examine a real-life case of flexible automatic response to see why the phenomenon requires us to postulate quasi-beliefs.  Recently I cut myself with an sharp knife while opening a box.  The next week I started to open another box, but suddenly got an urge not to touch the knife.  The urge was so sudden and so powerful that I actually drew my hand back from the knife.  Now I did not create a knife‑avoiding reflex like the non‑volitional reflex arc controlling the knee jerk.  And it did not seem to be caused by any straightforward belief that I had, for I had no belief that would generate a strong urge to pull away from the knife.  Certainly there were beliefs in my head that would explain a desire to be cautious with the knife, but not one that would explain my not wanting even to touch it.  The urge seems to have been caused by my desire not to be cut, together with a quasi-belief that I would cut myself with the knife.
	One might think that my mere believing that the knife might cut me (a belief which I clearly did have) is enough to explain my avoidance of the knife: it is just that I overestimated the chances (or the "badness") of this happening.  The problem with this explanation is that my estimation of the probability (or the badness) of my cutting myself must also be a belief (or perhaps part of the belief that I might cut myself).  But--and this is crucial--I did not believe that a mishap was likely enough (or bad enough) for the belief about its probability (or badness) to be the cause of my pulling back.  After all, of all the countless times I have used knives, I have only cut myself a very small number of times, and when I did, the injuries were minor.  And this estimation of the probability or seriousness of a mishap did not change appreciably after the incident in which I cut myself--I still believed that the actual likelihood of mishap on any particular knife use is so low (and the possible injury so minor) that the risk was quite acceptable especially when compared with the alternative of eschewing all use of knives.  It is clear then that something besides my beliefs about the likelihood (or badness) of cutting myself combined with my desire to avoid injury to produce my desire to avoid the knife.  The best hypothesis is that a quasi-belief (to the effect that the probability or badness, or both, of being cut was at least very high) caused my desire to avoid the knife. 
	Here are a two more examples of flexible automatic response that support my claim that there must be quasi-beliefs.  As a boy I played Little League baseball.  I watched over and over as children became convinced that the best (and safest) thing to do at the approach of the baseball is to put the glove up and catch it rather than shrinking away or flinching.  But that change in belief by itself was essentially powerless to get the children to put the glove up rather than flinch.  Students in martial arts and self-defense classes are typically taught not to retreat from an attack but rather to move to the side of the attacker.  I have watched whole rooms-full of people acquire the very strong belief that the best (and safest) response to an attack is to move to the side rather than backwards, and that moving backwards is indeed a very bad thing to do.  I have watched--over and over--whole rooms-full of such people (myself included) move backwards rather than to the side.  The phenomenon is so incredibly robust that it would be humorous were it not so frustrating--and dangerous.
	There are several reasons why we must say that flexible automatic responses are caused by something other than regular (straightforward) beliefs.  First, a change in belief is by itself ineffective in changing desires involved in flexible automatic response.  If I desire the contents of a particular glass because I believe that it contains a chocolate shake (and I want a chocolate shake), and if I come to find out that the glass really contains used motor oil (which I do not want), then my desire for the contents of the glass evaporates.  But a change in belief is not effective in this way in changing motivation associated with flexible automatic response.  The Little Leaguers come to believe that putting the glove up is safer (and otherwise more productive) than flinching, and the martial arts students come to believe that moving to the side is safer than retreating.  Yet the change in belief by itself does not cause the children to put the glove up rather than flinch or cause the students to move to the side rather than backwards.  Often only non-cognitive means, especially repetition, are effective in getting people to perform the action they believe best and to not perform actions they believe sub-optimal.​[10]​  This strongly suggests that something besides beliefs is influencing motivation.
	Second, the beliefs one would need to postulate to make good foundational sense (in the context of MF) of some flexible automatic response are quite often ones that the person just does not have.  The children playing baseball may be absolutely convinced that flinching will not prevent the ball from hitting them; the retreating martial arts students may be absolutely convinced that retreating is dangerous.  I was sure that I could handle the knife safely.
	Third, the informational states causing flexible automatic responses do not "creep out" of their contexts and infect other representational states, as we would at least sometimes expect if they were straightforward beliefs.  Thus while the belief that the cup contains used motor oil may show up again as a premise in a practical inference involving the best way to lubricate my car door, the representational state that links my desire to avoid pain to the action of avoiding the knife, or the martial art student's desire to avoid pain with his moving backwards, do not show up as premises anywhere else.  The martial arts student does not come to believe that his instructor is a liar since she told him that retreating is dangerous and yet it is not.  The Little Leaguer does not come to believe a similar thing about his coach.  I did not determine that I should remove all knives from my house, or vow to begin an anti-knife lobby, as I might have if I had straightforwardly believed that merely touching the knife would cause it to cut me.
	These considerations make it clear that representations with importantly different properties from those of straightforward beliefs can cause motivation, and that these representational states fit the definition of quasi-belief.  I now turn to the claim that operant conditioning, like flexible automatic response, sometimes involves the acquisition of information-bearing quasi-beliefs.​[11]​
	Why think that operant conditioning involves information acquisition?  The main reason is that the effects of operant conditioning depend on the motivational state of the organism in a certain way.  If a rat has been reinforced with food for running a maze, its maze-running behavior will tend to occur more when the rat is hungry.  This result allows us to treat what is acquired in conditioning as a state which has informational content that can be used in (though not across) motivational contexts.  We can treat the rat as having been given the information that maze-running promotes hunger-satisfaction.  This information interacts with the desire for food to produce a new motivation to run the maze.  Note that this interaction of (what can be treated as being) an informational state with a motivational state follows the schema that defines MMF.  It looks, then, as though operant conditioning implants a state that can be treated as bearing information and which can combine with motivational states to produce new motivational states.
	A second reason we should treat conditioned states as having content involves the relation between the behavior of an organism that has been conditioned and the details of its conditioning.  Suppose an organism has undergone a conditioning process that creates a state that acts as though it has the informational content `action a promotes the satisfaction of desire d'.  In the causal history of such an organism we will always find some process which "links" a to d.  Such a process will generally involve a being followed by the satisfaction of d.  So not only do states resulting from conditioning act as though they had content, this content is a function of the genesis of the state.  In this way the states that arise from conditioning are very much like beliefs: both are created in such a way that they represent or indicate facts about the world, and both are then used to produce motivation in a way that exploits this information.
	But the states that conditioning can produce are not beliefs in the straightforward sense.  Two bodies of evidence support this claim.  First, it is an empirical fact quite beyond dispute that operant conditioning can work on human beings regardless of our (straightforward) beliefs.  An entire approach to therapy--namely behavior therapy--has as its cornerstone the fact that conditioning techniques can alter behavior regardless of one's beliefs.  Behavior therapy is often successful.  And it is often successful when more cognitive therapeutic approaches fail.  Hardly anyone is ever "talked" out of a nicotine addiction, and psychotherapy has a poor record in curing Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.  But behavior therapy based on operant conditioning principles has a respectable record in treating both addiction and OCD.  Behavior therapists often ignore the patient's beliefs and apply reinforcement schedules and other conditioning tools.  Aversive therapy to eliminate smoking, for instance, does not work by getting the patient to believe that smoking is harmful--the smoker already knows that.  That this approach can in fact change behavior is an empirical fact quite beyond doubt.  It seems clear, then, that conditioning principles can change behavior without changing belief.  Whatever conditioning does, then, it can do it without instilling beliefs.
	The second source of evidence that conditioning can produce informational states that are not beliefs comes from some very clever psychological experiments.  A detailed examination of these experiments would take us too far afield here, but the gist is as follows.  They involve what psychologists call "devaluing" a reinforcer, that is, tainting something the organism likes so that it causes pain or sickness.  The idea is that if the animal can make a very simple deductive inference, it will "realize" that the putative reinforcer has been devalued (for example, that the food will cause sickness).  It turns out that rats can under some circumstances make these simple inferences.  But it also turns out that under other circumstances--when the rat has been conditioned in a certain way (one which involves far greater repetition) to go after the food--it goes for the food regardless of the fact that, if it had not been conditioned this way, it would have avoided the tainted reinforcer.  The conclusion is that certain kinds of conditioning processes instill states that are insulated from other informational states and cannot be eliminated by the kind of "reasoning" that the rat is in other cases perfectly capable of performing.  These states are encapsulated relative to other information the rat has and other mental processes the rat is capable of performing.​[12]​  In addition, there seems to be a growing consensus among memory and learning theorists that the higher animals have two forms of learning/memory: one that involves very simple stimulus response linkages and another that consists of a complex semantic net the elements of which are highly interconnected.  A consequence of these characterizations seems to be that the elements of the simple system will be encapsulated and those in the complex system will not be.​[13]​  In short, there is evidence that certain kinds of conditioning can produce states that are encapsulated relative to the main store of information.  And as we noted above, encapsulation is the key feature that separates quasi-beliefs from beliefs.  
	I conclude that conditioning can impart informational states that are not beliefs, and that these states interact with desires to produce new desires.  In other words, they produce informationally encapsulated quasi-beliefs.  I further conclude that cases (like Case 1) in which conditioning results in a motive that is apparently caused by a state the content of which the person does not believe, and which persists in spite of the fact that the person in fact believes the contradiction of that proposition, are cases in which quasi-beliefs have arisen.
	One might wonder what exactly the content of a quasi-belief is.  Theories that explain operant conditioning and related phenomena postulate a connection between a set of initial conditions (including a stimulus and an antecedent motivational state) and a tendency to act.  The quasi-belief corresponding to such a connection would have a propositional content of the form: `Action a promotes the fulfilling of a desire for d under conditions c'.  That quasi-belief combines in a straightforward way with a desire for d to yield a desire to perform action a.  The exact content of a quasi-belief will depend on the actual conditioning that has gone on.  Suppose that Jack received an electrical shock every time he was presented with a person with a tie and did not bark.  In that case his quasi-belief would be something like: `If I do not bark at ties I will be in pain', or, more precisely, `Barking at ties promotes pain-avoidance'.  Suppose Hansel talks a coworker into giving him a cookie when he has worked diligently.  Assuming that this procedure constitutes a true conditioning process, his quasi-belief will be: `Working hard (at my place of work) promotes hunger-satisfaction'.

IV. QUASI-BELIEFS AND ALIEN DESIRE
If we postulate conflicts between the contents of quasi-beliefs and normal beliefs, we can account for cases in which a person desires to act as she would if she believed something she does not in fact believe.  And this was how we pretheoretically characterized alien desire.  In the context of the quasi-belief theory, we can construct a (partial) theory of alien desire.  An alien (non-basic) desire is one that is generated by a quasi-belief whose content conflicts with that of a straightforward (possibly only tacit) belief.  Let me introduce the following terminology.  A discordant quasi-belief of S is one that has a content that contradicts the content of some belief of S.  A concordant quasi-belief of S is one that does not contradict any of S's beliefs.  An alien desire is one whose genesis involves a discordant quasi-belief.​[14]​
	On the present theory it turns out that what makes some cases of conditioned motivation alien is not that the conditioning is against the victim's will.  Rather it is that these cases involve a discordant quasi-belief.  If we force someone to undergo conditioning--even against his will--and instill a non-discordant quasi-belief, we do not create an alien desire.  And though we have probably wronged him morally, the wrong, a fortiori, is not a result of our implanting an alien desire.  So, to return to Case 1, Jack's desire is alien not because the conditioning took place against his will, but rather because it is produced by a discordant quasi-belief.  Jack is motivated as though he has a belief he does not have because his motivation is being produced by a quasi-belief with a content he disbelieves.  And that is what makes it alien.  The definition of alien desire I propose also implies that the retreating martial-arts students and the flinching Little Leaguers have alien desires.  I concede that we may not have strong pretheoretical intuitions that this is the case.  But neither is this result counterintuitive: there is a clear sense in which these persons' activities are in fact alienated from their rational selves.  We should expect theories that capture our intuitions to have implications about cases about which we did not originally have strong intuitions.  Indeed this is part of why philosophers construct theories rather than rely on intuitions.  So long as these implications are not counterintuitive--and they are not--they present no problem for the quasi-belief theory.
	So our moral assessment of particular cases of desire produced by quasi-beliefs will depend on the exact content of the person's beliefs and quasi-beliefs.  And the content of a quasi-belief will depend on the details of the conditioning process.  Suppose Hansel attempts to implement the first order desire to be a diligent worker by having his co-worker give him a cookie when he works hard.  Assuming that operant conditioning goes on (and that there is thus more than just Hansel consciously reasoning that since he wants the cookie he should get to work​[15]​), what is the quasi-belief?  The answer to that question will depend on details not present in the story we have been using so far.  So let us fill in the details in Hansel's case a bit more.  Here is one way to do so.
Case 3A: Hansel is famished all day at work.  His co-worker gives him a cookie when he works hard, and this is his only source of food all day.  After three months of this, the co-worker stops giving Hansel cookies, but Hansel continues to be motivated to work hard.

In Case 3A the quasi-belief would have the content
	(1) `Hard work promotes hunger-satisfaction.' 
This quasi-belief will account for the fact that Hansel continues to be motivated to work even after his working is no longer reinforced with cookies.  Whether or not Hansel straightforwardly believes (1) (after the conditioning is over) will depend on the details of the case.
	Suppose that once the conditioning is over Hansel believes that (1) is false.  Perhaps he believes that even if he does work harder, he is unlikely to be rewarded by management at all, either financially or in terms of job security, so that working harder is unlikely to have any impact on his prospects for keeping food in his stomach.  If the process described in Case 3A were to occur, so that the content of Hansel's quasi-belief was (1), his desire would be alien.  Could Hansel condition himself to have an authentic desire?  Suppose he wants to want to work harder because he believes it will improve his self-esteem.  He could set up the following situation:  
Case 3B: Hansel is well fed.  But when he receives the cookie, he gets a warm feeling of accomplishment and recognition, and feels good about himself.  After three months of this, the co-worker stops giving Hansel cookies, but Hansel continues to be motivated to work hard.
In this case content of Hansel's quasi-belief would be 
	(2) `Hard work promotes self-esteem.'
And since we are assuming that this is what Hansel believes, Hansel's desire would be authentic.
	Now there are various ways to tell which of these stories is true, and thus which content Hansel's quasi-belief has.  For example, if Case 3A occurred, we would expect Hansel to come to desire to work hard anytime he was hungry at work.  More precisely, we would expect, ceteris paribus, that Hansel would be more motivated to work when hungry than when not hungry.  If Case 3B occurred, we would expect hunger to have no effect on Hansel's motivation to work (or at least no more effect than it had before the conditioning).  Instead, we would expect him to be more motivated, ceteris paribus, when his self-esteem motive is stronger (psychologists have ways of measuring this).  All of these, and probably more, are public and verifiable ways of determining the content of Hansel's quasi-belief.  Of course figuring this out in any particular case is apt to be quite hard.  Fortunately, that is a task for psychologists rather than philosophers.  But it is clear--and this is the crucial point--that there are ways to tell which content the quasi-belief has.  These ways provide us (in principle, at least) with a determinate way to tell alien from authentic desires.  This is part of what we wanted from our analysis.
	We also wanted some account of the sense in which alien desires seem to be alien--that is, separate from the self.  A virtue of the quasi-belief theory is that it gives us a plausible conception of authenticity which tells us just that.   According to this conception, a self is a believer.  Notice that I have not said that the self is fundamentally a believer, or essentially a believer, or only a believer.  I am only claiming that whatever else a self is, it is a believer.  Nor have I said that a self is, essentially or otherwise, her beliefs.  I am only claiming that the self is what has the beliefs.  I cannot see how a plausible conception of the self could deny this.
	Now there is a clear sense in which quasi-beliefs are outside the self conceived as a believer.  To see why, we must see how regular beliefs are part of the self.  First, the self has at least potential direct access to what it believes.  I can reflect on my beliefs, evaluate them, etc., and all this "from the inside."  Reflecting on quasi-beliefs is more like reflecting on the beliefs of someone else: one cannot get at them directly, but rather must infer their presence from the presence of motivation not otherwise accounted for.  And it seems that part of what it is to be a believer involves the potential to modify one's beliefs through cognitive means.  And one cannot do this with quasi-beliefs.  In addition, the methods one must use to change an alien desire are much like the methods one often uses to change behavior in others.  Desires produced by quasi-beliefs cannot be changed by a change in belief, but only by non-cognitive means, typically through repetition and positive or negative reinforcement.  Again, this feature makes alien desires more like the desires of someone else than like one's own.
	We also wanted our analysis to account for the common intuition that ceteris paribus, someone's authentically desiring that P in and of itself makes P's obtaining valuable for her, while someone's alien desire that P does not in and of itself make P's obtaining valuable for her.  It is likely that some feature of the quasi-beliefs involved explains the difference.  But what?  Notice that in Jack's case, the quasi-belief is both discordant and false.  Does the satisfaction of his desire fail to create value because the quasi-belief is discordant or because its content is false?
	Now it does seem clear that the Desire Theory of Value should say that the falsity of a quasi-belief makes the satisfaction of a desire on which it is based not value-creating.  For plausible versions of that theory of value claim that only the satisfaction of desires based on true beliefs or full information creates value.​[16]​  So the desire-theorist ought to say that the satisfaction of desires based on false quasi-beliefs is not value creating.  The point of the full information requirement is to rule desires produced by false information as not value creating.  The analysis of alien desires as involving belief-like representational states shows us how desires can be based on false information even when the agent does not believe the false information.  And that is a very important achievement.  For it allows us to account for the non-value-creating status of any alien desire which is caused by a quasi-belief which is both discordant and false.  So the analysis of alien desires plus the full information requirement suffice perfectly to show why it is quite consistent for the Desire Theory of Value to say that many alien desires are not value-creating.
	Notice, though, that if it is the falsity of the quasi-belief that makes alien desire satisfaction fail to create value, then the correlation between a desire's being alien and its satisfaction being not value-creating is not perfect.  The satisfaction of some alien desires could produce value.  This would occur if the quasi-belief were discordant but true.  This result may seem to be in tension with our initial intuitions that the satisfaction of alien desires is not value producing.  Now it probably will turn out that most alien desires are in fact based on false propositions and thus are such that their satisfaction does not create value (given a full information requirement).  This is because the mechanisms that create beliefs are more epistemically sensitive, more sophisticated in their truth-tracking abilities, than the more primitive conditioning mechanisms that create quasi-beliefs.  This means that when the content of a belief contradicts the content of a quasi-belief, more often than not it will be the quasi-belief that is false.  And this in turn means that, more often than not, alien desires will be based on false propositions.  So it will turn out that most alien desires do not create value on the analysis I am suggesting.  
        But surely some will, and this fact seems prima facie to be in tension with the common intuition that the satisfaction of alien desires does not produce value.  Yet it should not be so surprising that the satisfaction of some alien desires--those based on true but unbelieved propositions--create value on the Desire Theory of Value.  For many plausible versions of that theory allow value to be created by desires that one does not in fact have but which one would have if all one's beliefs were true, if one has full information, etc.  Alien desires based on true but discordant quasi-beliefs are just a special case of this.  If the Desire Theory of Value can allow a person's good to be determined by desires she does not have but would have if she had certain true beliefs she does not have, then it ought to allow her good to be determined by desires based on true propositions she does not believe but which she does quasi-believe.
	Moreover, just because we allow that some alien desires create value, we are not committed to saying that having them is a good thing even prima facie.  Nor are we committed to saying that satisfying them is a good thing on balance.  Thus the idea that the satisfaction of an alien desire might create value is not as counterintuitive as it may seem, for that fact alone does not mean that such alien desires have the same moral status as authentic desires.  Not all of our moral disapproval of a certain class of desires needs to be expressed in the judgement that the satisfaction of those desires does not create value.  I conclude that the satisfaction of alien desires that are based on true quasi-beliefs‑‑which are not paradigm cases of alien desire‑‑are such the their satisfaction creates value.​[17]​

















^1	 .. Desires like those in Case One are often called heteronomous while desires like those in Case Two are labeled autonomous.  I do not follow this usage here because the term `autonomy' is used in many different ways, and I want to avoid any premature linking of this project with other bodies of autonomy theory.
^2	 .. For some autonomy literature involving conditioning, see Gerald Dworkin, "Autonomy and Behavior Control" (Hastings Center Report, February, 1976) and The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Young, "Compatibilism and Conditioning" (Nous 13 (1979): 361-78); and P. S. Greenspan, "Behavior Control and Freedom of Action" (Philosophical Review 87: 225-40).
^3	 ..  Indeed, a desire-based theory of value must hold that desire-satisfaction creates value over and above the value produced by the prevention of the distress that accompanies desire-frustration.  Otherwise the desire is not really doing the work and the theory is not really desire-based.  Rather it would be some form of hedonism, with value being produced not by desires satisfaction but by some pleasant mental state that accompanies it.  Of course I cannot argue against hedonism here.  I want only to illustrate how their existence bears on important issues in practical philosophy.
^4	 ..  This suggestion is the basis for what is currently the most influential theory of autonomy, that of Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt.  For articles by Dworkin, see note 2 above; for Frankfurt's view, see "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" and "Identification and Wholeheartedness" in John Christman, ed., The Inner Citadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
^5	 ..  Some psychologists use `classical' or `Pavlovian' to refer to processes that I will call operant.  This usage seems to be a result of a view that one can explain operant phenomena in the same terms that have been used to explain classical phenomena.  In addition one often finds `conditioning' used to refer to any process involving learning.  This usage seems to be a result of the view that all learning (whether learning is construed behavioristically or in terms of belief-acquisition) is to be explained in terms of conditioning.  I do not want to endorse or reject either of these views here.  Nor do I mean to claim that conditioning never creates beliefs.  All I claim is that conditioning mechanisms can sometimes operate on behavior apparently without changing beliefs (or what folk psychology calls beliefs).
^6	 ..  For more on this, see James Russell's three-part article, "Action from Knowledge and Conditioned Behaviour" (Behaviorism 8 [1980]: 87‑98; 133‑148; 107‑126).
^7	 .. Audi, Robert. "The Structure of Motivation." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1980): 258-75.  I discuss Motivational Foundationalism in more detail in "The Nature of Motivation," American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, March 31, 1994.
^8	 ..  Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).
^9	 .. See Gordon Logan, "Toward an Instance Theory of Automatization," (Psychological Review 95 [1988]: 492‑527); "Automaticity and Cognitive Control" in James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh, eds., Unintended Thought (New York: Guilford, 1989); and "Skill and Automaticity: Relations, Implications, and Future Directions" (Canadian Journal of Psychology 39 [1987]: 367‑86).
^10	 ..  For some psychological literature on this point, see the articles by Gordon Logan cited above, and John Reason, "Actions Not As Planned: The Price of Automatization" in G. Underwood and S. Stevens, eds., Aspects of Consciousness (London: Academic Press, 1979).
^11	 ..  Strictly speaking I will be arguing that operant conditioning (like flexible automatic response) at least sometimes involves states that can be treated as having informational content.  In order to argue for a stronger thesis, I would need to show that there is such a thing as really having content and say what is required for a state to really have content.  Such a project is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but fortunately my analysis of alien desire will not require such a strong thesis.
^12	 .. See C. Adams and A. Dickinson, "Actions and Habits: Variations in Associative Representations during Instrumental Learning" in N. Spear and R. Miller, eds., Information Processing in Animals: Memory Mechanisms (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981).  Other experiments suggest that the insulated type of conditioning actually works on a part of the brain (the hippocampal formation) that is anatomically separate from the locus of the less insulated states.  See R. J. Sutherland and J. W. Rudy, "Configural Association Theory: The Role of the Hippocampal Formation in Learning, Memory, and Amnesia" (Psychobiology 17 (1989): 129-44).
^13	 ..  See Abram Amsel, Behaviorism, Neobehaviorism, and Cognitivism in Learning Theory (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1989) for an accessible review of this issue (inter alia).
^14	 ..  A full definition of alien desire will need to be quite complex to deal with various complications that arise from a more sophisticated theory of desires (e.g., considerations about desire strength and the possibility of partially alien desires).  It will also have to say something about the possibility of alien basic desires.  A further complication is that there are two ways that a quasi-belief may be concordant.  Its propositional content may be identical to the content of a straightforward belief.  We might call such quasi-beliefs strongly concordant.  But a quasi-belief might have a content that is neither identical with nor the denial of the content of any straightforward belief.  Such quasi-beliefs will have contents that are either consistent or inconsistent with the contents of one's straightforward beliefs.  Call those that have contents which are consistent weakly concordant, and those that have contents which are inconsistent weakly discordant.  I will not explore here differences in the moral statuses of strongly versus weakly concordant quasi-beliefs or strongly versus weakly discordant quasi-beliefs. 
^15	 ..  The way to tell the difference is to see what happens if the reinforcement contingency is lifted.  Suppose Hansel revokes his agreement with the co-worker, eats before coming to work, and no longer has her feed him.  If Hansel's motivation to work continues, it is evidence that there has been true conditioning. 
^16	 .. See Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), and James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986).  I am assuming here what these and other authors have argued, namely that the actual desire theory is untenable and that the desire theory supplemented by some sort of full information requirement is at least plausible.  For a recent argument against the full information requirement, and, by implication, against the desire theory of value, see, David Sobel, "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104 (July 1994): 784-810.
^17	 ..  The proponent of Desire Theory of Value might suggest some new principle that rules all alien desire satisfaction as non value creating.  Or he might redefine the notion of alien desires so that only those based on false discordant quasi-beliefs are really alien.  But I think we should avoid either of these ad hoc moves and keep the definition of alien desire as it is.  The notion of alien desire was meant in part to capture the intuitive judgement that they are in an important sense external to the agent.  This intuition is captured by the notion of quasi-belief, which allows us to speak of an attitude toward a proposition being a cause of a desire without that proposition being believed.  Changing the definition of alien desire to include as alien only those desires in which a false quasi-belief is involved ignores this intuition.  True propositions can be the objects of states that are external to us just false ones can.  If a desire is alien because it is caused by a mental state with a content I do not believe, the fact that the thing I do not believe happens to be true does not make the desire any less external to me.
^18	 ..  Of course if their repugnance causes us to desire not to be moved by them, and if this desire is stronger than a given alien desire, then fulfilling the alien desire will not create value on balance.
^19	 ..  I wish to thank Walter Edelberg for extensive comments on several drafts of this material.  Gerald Dworkin, Shelly Kagan, Alfred Mele, and Owen Flanagan also provided useful comments, as did several of my fellow graduate students who attended a reading of a version of the paper at the University of Illinois Philosophy Department Graduate Student Colloquium.  This paper was written while I was on a Dean's Scholar Fellowship from the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Chicago, and I wish to express my gratitude for that support.
